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MANAGING CATASTROPHIC RISKS THROUGH INSURANCE AND MITIGATION
I.  INTRODUCTION
Insurance is the only policy tool in the analyst’s repertoire that can reward individuals for
taking  loss reduction measures in advance of a disaster  by giving them lower premiums
while at the same time  providing these same policyholders with compensation should they
suffer losses from the insured event.  In theory insurers could refuse to provide coverage
against certain events unless the prospective policyholder undertook certain protective
measures to lower the potential losses from the risk in question. Although this was
common practice with respect to fire coverage in the 19
th century, insurers have been
reluctant to do deny coverage on these grounds today.
This paper examines the  impact the role that insurance and other policy tools can play in
encouraging property owners to take steps to reduce losses from natural hazards such as
earthquakes, floods and hurricanes and the impact that these measures will have on the
solvency of insurers Three basic questions will be addressed in this regard:
(1)  What are the necessary and sufficient conditions  for  property owners to want
to adopt  cost-effective risk mitigation measures (RMM)s?
 
(2)  What impact will mitigation measures have on the profitability and insolvency
of insurers and their willingness to pass the expected reduction in losses to
property owners?
 
(3)  What is the appropriate role of building codes, third party inspections and
enforcement mechanisms in encouraging the adoption of mitigation measures
on property?
The next section of the paper focuses on the demand side by developing a simple model
for determining when property owners should adopt cost-effective measures and provides
empirical evidence as to why most individuals do not utilize this model. Section III  turns
to the supply side and investigates under what conditions insurers will want to promote
mitigation through premium reductions. It also explores the linkage between mitigation
and insurers’ need for financial protection through reinsurance and/or capital market
instruments that have recently been introduced. The importance of building codes as a
necessary means of enforcing mitigation in a hazard management program is examined in
Section IV. The concluding section proposes a plan of research for evaluating the
importance of insurance coupled with mitigation and other policy tools for reducing future
disaster losses.3
II   DEMAND FOR MITIGATION MEASURES BY PROPERTY OWNERS
Investments in RMMs involve an upfront cost in exchange for a stream of benefits
accruing over time in the form of reduced expected losses.  For example, if one were to
brace the concrete foundation of ones house it might cost the property owner $1500.
Should an severe earthquake occur in the vicinity of the property the damage might be
reduced by $20,000 if the house is prevented from toppling off its foundation. These
expected benefits accrue over the lifetime of the property.
Theoretical Analysis
Discounted utility theory introduced by Samuelson (1937) and derived axiomatically by
Koopmans (1960) has been the dominant approach for modeling such intertemporal
problems when future outcomes are known with certainty. The basic concept is that
people act as though they utilize an exponential  discount function for evaluating a
sequence of deterministic outcomes in each period t [x(t)] over a time horizon of T
periods. For investments in RMMs when outcomes are specified by a probability
distribution, individuals must decide how much money to expend money today to reduce
the consequences over a T period horizon where there is a probability pi of outcome  xi(t),
i=1...n occurring in any period t ˛T assuming a discount rate of  r  (e.g. r=.10). Appendix
1  develops a more formal model indicating how much an individual is willing to pay for
an RMM if her objective is to maximize discounted expected utility.
To illustrate the tradeoffs  that a property owner is willing to make in determining how
much to invest in an RMM,  suppose that the cost of bracing the concrete foundation of
your house is $1500. The reduction in damage to the house if it does not topple off its
foundation is $20,000. The RMM reduces the annual probability of an earthquake  causing
the structure from toppling off its foundation from pi = 1/20 to pi
* = 1/40.  If the individual
is risk neutral, the expected annual benefits of the RMM is (1/20-1/40) $20,000 = $500.
If  the homeowner expects to live in the property for a  10 year period  and has a discount
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rate of  r, then the discounted expected benefits for this measure is ￿ $500/(1+r)
t . Table
          
t=1
1  shows the maximum willingness to pay (WTP)  as the time horizon changes from 1 year
to  20 years and the discount rate (r)  is either 10% or 20%. As one can see a person is
willing to pay $500 if she only considers the benefits for  1 year; the amount rises to
$4682 if  the time horizon is  20 years and the discount rate is  10%. Note that these dollar
figures are based on an assumption that the investment in an RMM is not capitalized in the
value of the house.
INSERT   TABLE  1  HERE4
Experimental Data
 To determine how much an individual is willing to pay for  a  protective measure we
conducted a set of controlled experiments in Pennsylvania and California. (Kunreuther,
Onculer, and Slovic 1997). Subjects were asked to specify the maximum they were willing
to pay for bracing the concrete foundation of their house if they plan to live in the house
for exactly 5 years. They were then asked to specify a maximum WTP if  the expect to live
in the house for exactly 10 years. Table 2  presents the  distribution of these WTP figures
for 84  students at the University of Pennsylvania, half of whom were not given a cost of
this measure and the other half of whom were given a price of $1500 for the RMM.
INSERT   TABLE  2   HERE
The  data reveal that only  12 percent of the individuals would be willing to pay over
$2000 for the measure if the price was not given and they expected to live in the house for
5 years. The proportion in this category increases to 18% for the group who were given a
price of $1500.  In other words, a relatively small proportion of subjects based as if they
made decisions based on benefit-cost comparisons using a reasonable discount rate. More
specifically Table 1 indicates that a  risk-neutral person should be willing to pay as much
as $2,085 if their discount rate was 10  percent and they expected to live in their house for
5 years. When the time  horizon is lengthened to  10 years  the maximum WTP from Table
1  with r=10% increases to $3,380. Yet only 7% of the subjects who were not given the
price chose to spend more than $3,000; the  percentage jumps to 17% for the class when
the price was given at $1,500.
The comparative data on different time horizons (5 years and 10 years) enables one to
determine the discount rate implied by the difference in subjects’ maximum WTP. For
example, if  a person expects to live in the house for 10 years then Table 1 suggests they
should be willing to pay almost $1300  ($3380- $2085)  for the RMM if their discount rate
was 10%. If the difference between the two prices was somewhat less than this amount,
then the implied discount rate would be higher than 10%.
Table 3 depicts the implied discount rates for the cases where either the price of the RMM
was not given and when it was given to the students.  The data provide a very clear
picture of three types of individuals for either design condition. One group (approximately
14%) exhibits behavior which suggests that they utilize reasonable discount rates (r £ .20)
in their decision on how much to pay for RMMs. There is then a gap between .20 <r <.50
and another group (between 48% and 50%) whose WTP implies discount rates greater
than .50. Finally approximately 1/3 of the respondents do not change their maximum WTP
at all, despite a doubling in  time horizon. About half of the individuals in this group,
labeled as “infinite” in Table 3, increase their probability of undertaking the RMM as T
increases from 5 to 10 years; the other half do not change either probability of purchase
and maximum WTP amounts.
INSERT   TABLE  3  HERE5
A  survey of 252 individuals visiting the Exploratorium museum in San Francisco provide
confirming evidence for the above experiment. Now three different time horizons were
utilized for obtaining the  maximum WTP when the price of the quake measure was given
at $1500. As shown in Table  4 only 14% of the respondents exhibited behavior consistent
with reasonable discount rates when T was extended from 5 to 10 years; the percentages
increase to over 25% when the horizons were lengthened from 10 to 20 years and from 5
to 20 years. As in the earlier experiment a significant proportion of the respondents had
either high discount rates (the mean value of r varied between  .67  and .74 depending on
the values of T). The last columns in Table 4 indicate that a significant number of
individuals did not change their maximum WTP as the time horizon was increased. For the
case where  the length of time in the house was extended from 5 to 10 years, 45 percent of
the subjects maintained the same price for the protective measure. (Kunreuther, Onculer
and Slovic  1997)
INSERT   TABLE 4  HERE
These high discount rates are consistent with empirical findings from Lowenstein and
Prelec (1992) when the outcomes are known with certainty. In addition, they imply that
when the future benefits are uncertain then there is a significant group of individuals who
are not willing to change the maximum price they are willing to pay for the measure even
when T changes either because they cannot afford to pay more and/or they are myopic.
Empirical Data
The empirical data on studies of mitigation adoption in hazard-prone areas of the United
States provide additional confirming evidence on this point. Even after Hurricane Andrew in
Florida in 1992, the most severe disaster in the United States, most residents in hurricane-prone
areas along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts appear not to have  made improvements to existing
dwellings that could reduce the amount of damage from another storm. A July 1994 telephone
survey of 1241 residents in six cities revealed that 37 percent of those interviewed indicated
that they had made some improvement to their residence. (Insurance Institute for Property
Loss Reduction 1995). Studies of the added costs of materials and labor for hurricane-resistant
designs have indicated that it will add no more than 4-5 percent to the cost of a new home and
that this additional expense is not substantial relative to the added benefits of safety and
security (Unnewehr 1994).
With respect to investing in RMMs to reduce quake damage, a 1989 survey of 3,500
homeowners in four California counties subject to the hazard, damage, only  between 5 and  9
percent of the respondents in each of these counties reported adopting any LRMs (Palm et. al.
1990). A follow-up survey of residents affected by the October 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake
by Palm and her colleagues and the Northridge earthquake of 1994 revealed that only 10
percent of homeowners invested in any type of  structural loss-reduction measure whether or
not they were affected by recent earthquakes in the State (Palm 1995).6
III  ENCOURAGING MITIGATION BY INSURERS
Historical Perspective
Loss prevention has long been an important part of the insurer’s mission to provide
protection against risk. The best example of using insurance as a viable means of reducing
risk and providing compensation after a loss comes from the factory mutual insurance
companies founded in the early 19
th century in New England. The mutuals required
inspections of the factory both prior to issuing a policy and after one was in force. Poor risks
had their policies canceled; premium reductions were given to factories that instituted loss
prevention measures.
As the mutual companies gained experience with fire risks they set up research departments to
determine what factors caused fires and how they could prevent them. For example, the
Boston Manufacturers worked with lantern manufacturers to encourage them to develop safer
designs and then advised all policyholders that they had to purchase lanterns from those
companies whose products met their specifications. In many cases, insurance would only be
provided to companies that adopted specific loss prevention methods. For example one
company, the Spinners Mutual, only insured risks where automatic sprinkler systems were
installed. The Manufacturers Mutual in Providence developed specifications for fire hoses and
advised mills to buy only from companies that met these standards. (Bainbridge 1952).
Until recently insurers  have not actively promoted the use of mitigation measures for
reducing losses from natural disasters. Uniform premiums were generally specified for
certain types of structures in hazard-prone areas without incentives to property owners
such as lower premiums and/or lower deductibles to encourage them to adopt these
measures. For example, in Australia no account has been taken of differing vulnerabilities
to the hazards of particular buildings so that the good risks were expected to subsidize the
bad risks. (Walker 1996).  In New Zealand the Earthquake Commission and its
predecessor charged the same blanket rate for earthquake coverage for all buildings
despite the fact that there were major improvements in the earthquake resistance of
buildings constructed since the 1970s.  (Walker and Fipenz  1997).
Insurers in the United States have not provided financial incentives for homeowners to
mitigate their structures. In fact, due to regulatory rate restrictions in the United States,
rates of been subsidized in hazard-prone areas such as the coast of Florida. (Klein 1997).
The combination of  uniform rates across structures with premiums below actuarially fair
levels in high hazard areas has a twofold negative impact on the need for mitigation:  the
level premium implies that RMMs produce no benefits  and  the subsidized rate provides
incentives for a property owner to buy insurance protection which reduces their need for
mitigation since they are covered by insurance should a disaster cause damage to their
structure.7
Three major developments in the past 10 years have changed the insurance industry’s
attitude toward mitigation. First, there have been increasing catastrophic losses from
natural disasters in recent years so that companies now recognize that they will have to
turn to mitigation to reduce their chances of insolvency from future catastrophic events.
Prior to 1988 the insurance industry worldwide had never experienced a loss great than $1
billion from a single event. Since that date, 15 disasters have exceeded  this figure and are
likely to be considerably higher in the future.  (Kunreuther and Roth  in press). Studies
have estimated that 25 percent of the insured damage from Hurricane Andrew (which
totalled more than $15 billion) could have been prevented had building codes been
enforced  (Insurance Research Council and Insurance Institute for Property Loss
Reduction (1995)
The second development has been the new advances in information technology (IT) and
risk assessment which enable insurers to estimate the chances and potential losses of
future disasters and catastrophic events  more accurately than in the past and reward those
who adopt mitigation measures with lower premiums . On the IT side, the development of
faster and more powerful computers enables one to examine extremely complex
phenomena in ways that were impossible even five years ago. Scientific advances in risk
assessment have  reduced the uncertainty associated with predicting  the chances and
consequences of  these  LP-HC events. Insurers and reinsurers are now developing
strategies for managing their portfolios, which now includes mitigation, so as to avoid
sufficiently large losses which cause an unacceptable loss of surplus (Insurance Services
Office 1996).
A  third development has been the formation of the Insurance Institute for Property Loss
Reduction (IIPLR), an independent, nonprofit organization formed by the property-
casualty insurance industry to encourage actions which reduce deaths, injuries, property
damage and economic losses from natural disasters.  IIPLR  has supported a number of
studies for  evaluating mitigation measures for reduces damage to property from floods,
earthquakes and hurricanes. It was a driving force behind the creation of the Building
Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule (BCEGS). This rating system, administered by the
Insurance Services Office measures how well building codes are enforced in communities
around the United States. IIPLR has also established partnerships with other
organizations, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the United States
Geological Survey, to encourage mitigation (Insurance Institute for Property Loss
Reduction 1997).
Theoretical Treatment
There is good reason for the insurance industry to actively promote mitigation today given
their concern with the possibility of insolvency from future disasters. The tension that
insurers face is how to reflect the reduced risks of losses through reduced premiums  to
property owners in the face of regulatory restrictions on how much they can charge and to
whom they must provide coverage.  We will illustrate these points by constructing a
hypothetical example which illustrates the potential benefits of mitigation for large and8
small insurers with and without reinsurance as a function of the demand for coverage. A
more formal model illustrating the tradeoffs appears in Appendix 2.
Consider an insurer who provides coverage for a single type structure  (e.g. a concrete
home)  and  faces a loss  (L’)  if a risk mitigation measure  is adopted and a loss (L”>L’)
if it is. For this  example,  L’ =$200,000 and  L”= $250,000 so the RMM reduces damage
by $50,000 should a quake occur. The insurer estimates the chances that  an earthquake
will occur in the region and damage any given insured property to be p = 1/100.  Based on
this information the insurer can calculate the expected loss for a structure with mitigation
[E(L’)= 1/100 ($200,000) =$2000] or without mitigation  [E(L”)= 1/100 ($250,000)
=$2500].  In other words the expected annual benefit from mitigation is  $500.
1
Suppose that an insurer  has  written  N=100  earthquake policies on this type structure in
a given region of the country and has calculated the probability that  n  or more homes will
be damaged by the quake give there is not a perfect correlation between losses. Table 5
provides the relevant annual probabilities and respective values of  L” and L’ for 0 to 8
losses for the case where an insurer has written N= 100  earthquake policies.
INSERT  TABLE  5  HERE
The insurer’s objective is to set premiums so as to maximize expected profits subject to an
insolvency constraint. Stone (1973) formalized these concepts by suggesting that an
underwriter who wants to determine the conditions for a specific risk to be insurable will
first focus on keeping the probability of insolvency (q)  below some threshold level (q*).
For this illustrative example suppose that q*= 1/100.  The question which the insurer must
address is what  premium to charge the property owner to encourage her to adopt
mitigation with a clear objective of maximizing expected profits while still meeting its
insolvency constraint.
Behavior by Large  Insurers    To begin the analysis consider the large insurer who has
enough initial capital and premium income so it is not concerned with the insolvency
constraint. Let SL represent the large insurer’s initial surplus and premium income from
charging the actuarially fair premium without mitigation. In the context of the data in
Table 5  suppose that SL= $1.2 million.. In this case the insurer will still have  positive
capital on hand unless it suffered more than four losses when mitigation is not adopted.
The probability of this happening is  1/125  so that the insurer has satisfied its insolvency
constraint since q*=1/100.
For this reason the insurer’s sole objective is to maximize expected profits. It has no desire
for reinsurance since it not concerned with reducing the chances of insolvency. Suppose
the insurer has the freedom to charge whatever rate the market will bear. In a purely
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case the probability of  damage from a quake is lower (1/100 rather than  1/40) and the actual savings
should a quake occur higher ($50,000  rather than  $20,000)9
competitive market, where premiums reflect  actuarial costs and there are no
administrative charges, this implies that the insurer will charge  a premium
P’=E(L’)=$2000 if  mitigation is adopted and P”=E(L”)= $2500 when mitigation is not
utilized.
Suppose that  a property owner has purchased coverage at the actuarial rate when no
mitigation is in place. Let  M be the maximum premium that the property owner will pay
and still be willing to adopt mitigation.  If  M>P’, then the insurer will offer a policy with
mitigation where the premium will range between  P’ and  M  depending on the degree of
allegiance the customer has to its current company. If customers are reluctant to search
for other insurance companies due to high transaction costs, then the price of insurance
with mitigation will be closer to M. When search costs are low, the insurer will charge a
premium closer to P’ so as not to lose its customer base. Thus if  M=$2200  insurers will
offer  policies for mitigated  homes that range from $2000 to $2200.
One of the great benefits of mitigation is a reduction in q. Specifically, if the large insurer
was able to encourage all its customers to adopt an RMM, and had SL=$1.21 million  then
from Table 5,  its probability of insolvency with mitigation is seen to be q=1/180 since it
can now absorb six losses rather than only four. From an insurer’s vantage point
mitigation truncates the worst case scenarios by reducing the losses on individual
structures.
Suppose the large insurer was forced to provide insurance to its 100 policyholders at a
premium (PR) below the actuarial cost but still had enough surplus on hand to satisfy the
insolvency constraint. Now  its attitude toward providing premium reductions for
mitigation will be somewhat different than when it had the freedom to charge whatever
rate it desired. Since the insurer is losing money on each of these policies (in an expected
value sense) it will only provide limited (if any)  premium reductions for mitigation if
homeowners were required to adopt these measures. For example, if  PR = $2300, then
the maximum premium reduction the insurer would provide would be  $300  to reduce the
cost to the policyholder to P’= $2000. If   PR < $2000  then  in this case the insurer would
provide no premium reduction since it would still be losing money on this property even if
mitigation were adopted.
On the other hand, if  the property owner was not required to adopt a mitigation
measure, then the  insurer would want to encourage him with some premium reduction as
long as it was forced to provide coverage. In fact, to minimize its expected loss the large
insurer would be willing to reduce the premium by as much as P”-P’ =$500. Of course,
the insurer would only provide this incentive to its existing policyholders. The firm would
refuse any new clients unless they adopted mitigation and in this case would charge them
at least $2000 for a policy.
Behavior By Small Insurers      We define a small insurer to be an entity where the
insolvency constraint is binding so that it is forced to sacrifice some expected profits to10
make sure that q=q*.  One way of viewing the concern with q* of these insurers is that a
regulatory authority requires them to show that they have enough surplus on hand to be
solvent in case of unexpected losses.
As we will see below, the concern with meeting insolvency conditions may help explain
the very high price that some insurers are willing to pay for reinsurance. Let  SS represent
the surplus of the small company. Now consider the Smally Company with surplus  SS=
$700,000   based on initial surplus (AS =$450,000) and premium income of  $250,000
based on selling 100 earthquake policies at  premium P”=$2,500  with no mitigation in
place . If Smally has to maintain its current portfolio, then it will not meet its insolvency
constraint. More  specifically we see from Table 5  that should it suffer 3 quake losses, it
will have claims totalling $750,000 which exceeds SS by $50,000. The probability of
suffering  3 or more losses is  q= 1/80  > q*=1/100. By turning to the reinsurance market
for an excess loss treaty,  Smally can lay off some of its claims and would be willing to pay
a relatively price to do so.
Suppose that Smally negotiated an excess of loss treaty with a reinsurer for  $250,000
excess of $500,000 to cover the costs of  the third loss should an earthquake occur.
2 This
type of treaty arrangement would reduce its probability of  insolvency from q=1/80 to
q=1/00, thus satisfying the regulator’s concern with insolvency. Two questions naturally
emerge: (1) How much would the reinsurer want to charge for such a policy based on
actuarial principles?  and (2) How much could the reinsurer charge Smally for such a
policy based on Smally’s concern with insolvency?
The first question can be answered using the actuarial data from Table 5. The
reinsurer is only concerned with the probability of  Smally suffering three or more losses,
in which case it will have to pay Smally  $250,000. The probability of such an event
occurring is   p=1/80. Hence the actuarially fair reinsurance premium is   R= 1/80
($250,000) = $3,333. Smally, on the other hand, is willing to pay considerably more for
such a policy to meet its insolvency constraint. Specifically, with  SS =$700,000  it will
theoretically be willing to pay up to $200,000 for such a policy, as shown in Appendix 2.
Even with such a high reinsurance premium it will still be solvent with  3 losses or less
since its total claim payments would be limited to $500,000; the regulator will tolerate the
possibility of  4 or more losses since  the probability of such an event is q=1/100.
Of course, no insurer would ever pay anything close to $200,000 for a policy which only
promises them $250,000 with a probability of  p=1/80. On the other hand, the small
insurer is very likely to be willing to pay the reinsurer somewhat more than the actuarial
fair premium of $3,333. How much the reinsurer will actually charge for this excess loss
protection depends on the degree of competition in the market. If there is a long-term
relationship built up between Smally and a specific reinsurer, then this firm has  more
flexibility in charging a higher premium than if Smally is shopping for protection. The
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emergence of new financial instruments makes it more attractive for Smally to widen its
circle for protection and may lower reinsurance prices in the future.
One way of avoiding reinsurance charges is for insurers like Smally to encourage their
policyholders to adopt mitigation measures through premium reductions. In the above
example  if Smally were able to induce all of its policyholders to mitigate their home, then
their losses from an earthquake is given in the last column of Table 5. In this situation
Smally will have more than enough surplus assets on hand to pay for 3 losses and will not
need to purchase reinsurance to meet the regulator’s concern with insolvency.
Due to its concern with insolvency, Smally would be willing to give its policyholders a
substantial premium reduction to encourage them to adopt a mitigation measure. The
detailed calculations are shown in Appendix 2. The informal argument can be summarized
as follows. Smally wants to show the regulator that it will have  SS=$600,000 on hand so
it can cover at least three earthquake losses when mitigation is in place. Since SS =700,000
it will be able to reduce its total premium by as much as $100,000  and still meet this
constraint. This means that it will be willing to reduce the premiums for each of its
policyholders by up to  $1,000 if they will adopt a mitigation measure. Since the
actuarially fair reduction in premiums is  only $500, Smally would be willing to incur an
expected loss on its earthquake book of business in order to meet its insolvency constraint.
Of course, when reinsurance is available,  Smally will make tradeoffs between the
reinsurance premium it will have to pay for coverage and the premium reduction it will
offer property owners in exchange for mitigation.
Conclusions on Insurer Behavior To summarize the findings regarding insurer
behavior, under  a market system the premium which an insurer is willing to charge for
encouraging mitigation depends on the following factors:  its surplus (S), the maximum
amount the homeowner is willing to pay for mitigation  (M), the regulated premium (PR)
compared to the actuarially fair premium if mitigation is in place (P”), the concern that
insurers have with the probability of insolvency (q*)  and the degree of competition
between insurers and reinsurers.
In addition, the above analysis suggests the importance of understanding the role of
insurance regulation in  promoting mitigation through such incentives as premium
reductions. If  the regulatory agency requires insurers to provide coverage to a group of
policyholders, then it becomes important to let them charge rates based on actuarial risk.
If insurers are not permitted to do so, they will have little incentive to encourage
mitigation if they feel that their policyholders will either go elsewhere or drop their
coverage. In fact, the insurer wants to do everything it can to make the policyholder leave
them. If, on the other hand,  an insurer knows that it is stuck with the policyholder, then it
will want to encourage him to adopt mitigation, even when the premium is required to be
subsidized by the regulator.  The basic rule in this case is a simple one: if the premium
reduction is less than the savings in expected claim payments due to mitigation, it is a
desirable action to promote.12
Small insurers face an additional problem in that they are required to meet insolvency
constraints. There are good reasons for regulators to insist on such conditions since
consumers may have a difficult time determining whether a insurer is operating in a
financially responsible manner. Large companies also favor these guidelines, since they are
normally held accountable for paying off claims of insolvent companies through residual
pools.  On the other hand, when small insurers are forced to meet these constraints they
are likely to be willing to pay premiums to reinsurers far in excess of actuarially-based
rates and encourage mitigation by offering larger than actuarially fair  premium discounts.
In both cases their behavior is designed to eliminate large losses at the expense of
expected profits.
 To the extent that regulators allow insurers to reduce their portfolio of risks in hazard-
prone areas and these insurers actually do so, the insolvency constraint will not be as
important a force in the premium-setting decision. New financial instruments may also
place competitive pressures on reinsurers to reduce their rates so this will aid insurers in
how much they have to pay for protection against catastrophic losses.
IV  ROLE OF BUILDING CODES
Consider the following scenario. Homeowners had perfect information on the risks
associated with natural disasters and invested in cost-effective mitigation measures
because they  maximized their discounted expected utility. Insurers and reinsurers utilized
this information on risk to price their products and provided premium discounts to those
who adopted mitigation meausres. All the costs of disasters could be allocated to specific
individuals and property. Then there would be no need for building codes. It is precisely
because these conditions are not fulfilled in practice that building codes are required. In
this section we explore two principal functions that building codes  serve
Correcting Misperception and Misinformation of the  Risk
Building codes force property owners to adopt mitigation measures when they would
otherwise not do so because they misperceive the benefits from adopting the RMM and/or
have underestimate the probability of a disaster occurring. As indicated in Section II
individuals often truncate the expected benefits from the mitigation measure due to
myopia and high discount rates. There is also empirical evidence that they underestimate
the chances of a disaster or behave as if the disaster “will not happen to me” in which case
they would have no interest in investing in any loss reducing measures. (Camerer and
Kunreuther 1989).
If  these property owners were forced to cover their own disaster losses then one might
contend that they have only themselves to blame for not taking preventive action.
However, all taxpayers bear some of the costs of the recovery from damaged property
through low interest federal loans and  grants. Hence there is an economic justification to
all citizens to design structures to be safer.13
There is also  limited interest by engineers and builders in designing safer structures if it means
incurring costs that they feel will hurt them competitively. Interviews with structural engineers
concerned with the performance of earthquake-resistant structures indicate that they have no
incentive to build structures that exceed existing codes because they have to justify  these
expenses to their clients and would lose out to other engineers who did not include these
features in the design  (May and Stark 1992).  Without building codes, they would even be
less interested in undertaking measures that will enable the structure to withstand the
forces of a disaster.
Well-enforced building codes correct any misinformation that potential property owners
have regarding the safety of the structure. For example, suppose the property owner
believes that the losses from an earthquake to the structure is  L’= $20,000  and the
developer knows that it  is L” = $25,000  because it is not well constructed. There is no
incentive for the developer to relay the correct information to the property owner because
the developer is not held liable should a quake cause damage to the building. If the insurer
is unaware of how well the the building is constructed, then this information cannot  be
conveyed to the potential property owner through a premium reflecting risk. Inspecting
the building to see that it meets code and then providing it with a seal of approval provides
accurate information to  the property owner.
Evidence from a  July 1994 telephone  survey of  1241 residents in six hurricane prone
areas on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts provides supporting evidence for some type of seal
of approval. Over 90 percent of the respondents felt  that  local home builders should be
required to follow building codes, and 85 percent considered it very important that local
building departments conduct inspection of new  residential construction. (Insurance
Institute for Property Loss Reduction 1995).
Reducing  Externalities
Cohen and Noll (1981) provide an additional rationale for building codes. When a building
collapses it may create externalities in the form of economic dislocations and other social costs
that are beyond the economic loss suffered by the owners. These may not be taken into
account when the owners evaluate the importance of adopting a specific mitigation measure.
Consider the following examples of externalities:
Triggering  Damage to Other Structures If a building topples off its
foundation after an earthquake it could break a pipeline and cause a major fire which
would damage other homes that were not affected by the earthquake in the first place.
This type of damage has a direct impact on the pricing of insurance in a hazard-prone area.
To see this point consider the following illustrative example building on the scenario
developed in Section II.  Suppose that  an unbraced structure that toppled in a severe
earthquake had  a  20 percent chance of bursting a pipeline and creating a fire which14
would severely damage   10 other homes, each of which would suffer $40,000 in damage.
Had the house been bolted to its foundation this series of events would not have occurred.
The insurer who provided coverage against these fire-damaged homes under a standard
homeowner’s  policy would then  have had  an additional expected loss  of  $80,000 (i.e.,
.2x10x$40,000) due to the lack of building codes requiring concrete block structures to be
braced in earthquake prone areas.  One option would be for homes adjacent to those that
are not mitigated to charged a higher fire premium to reflect the additional hazard from
living next to the unprotected house. In fact, this additional  premium should be charged
to the unprotected structure which caused the damage, but this cannot legally be done.
Hence, each of the 10  homes that are vulnerable to fire damage from the quake would be
charged this extra premium.
The relevant point for this analysis is that there is an additional annual expected benefit
from mitigation over and above the reduction in losses to the specific structure adopting
this RMM. All financial institutions and insurers who are responsible for these other
properties at risk would favor building codes to protect their investments and/or reduce
the insurance premiums they charge for fire following earthquake .
Social Costs Arising from Property Damage If  a family is forced to vacate
their property because of damage to a quake which would have been obviated if  a
building code had been in place, then this is an additional cost which needs to taken into
account when determining the benefits of mitigation. Suppose that the property is
expected to need food and shelter  for   t  days (e.g. t = 50)  at a daily cost of  D = $30.
Then the additional expense  from not having mitigated after a disaster occurs  is t x D
(i.e.,  50 x $100 = $5000).  If the annual chances of the disaster occurring  is p =1/100,
then the annual expected extra cost to the taxpayer  of  not mitigating  is   p x t xD  (i.e.,
1/100 x 50 x $100  = $50). Although this may not appear to be a very large amount,  it
amounts to an expected discounted cost of   over $560 for a 30 year period if  an 8%
discount rate were utilized.  Should there be a large number of households that need to be
provided with food and shelter, these costs could mount rapidly.
In addition to these temporary food and housing costs, the destruction of  commercial
property could cause business interruption losses and the eventual bankruptcy of many
firms. The impact on the fabric of the community and its economic base from this
destruction could be enormous. In a study estimating the physical and human
consequences of a major earthquake in the Shelby County/Memphis, Tennessee area,
located near the New Madrid fault,  Litan et al. (1992,  pp. 65-66)  found  that the
temporary losses in economic output stemming from damage to workplaces could be as
much as $7.6 billion based on the magnitude of unemployment and the accompanying
losses in wages, profits and indirect “multiplier” effects.
The study estimates that the regionalized gross national product savings from the use of
mitigation measures (i.e. retrofitting existing buildings) could increase the total economic15
benefits by approximately 75 percent. In their study of Shelby County, they still found the
benefit-cost ratio associated with comprehensive retrofitting of all buildings to be below
1.0. However, their study suggests that selective building codes for certain structures
could be beneficial, particularly in the light of these additional economic benefits.
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This section  summarizes the principal findings of the paper and proposes a plan of
research which will enable us to more fully understand the role that mitigation can play in
conjunction with other policy tools for managing natural disasters.
Principal Findings
There are several conclusions that emerge from this analysis of the role of mitigation
measures in dealing with catastrophic losses. For one thing, property owners are reluctant
to incur the upfront costs of risk mitigation measures because they either misperceive
risks, are myopic and/or face severe budget constraints. On the other hand, premium
reductions for undertaking loss prevention methods can be an important first step in
encouraging property owners to adopt these measures. Due to regulatory constraints on
pricing, insurers will not voluntarily provide these incentives unless they are forced to
provide coverage to individuals in hazard-prone areas and/or  face insolvency constraints.
The analyses also indicate why small insurers, who are concerned with meeting insolvency
constraints,  may be forced to pay high prices for reinsurance when mitigation is not in
place. For this reason alone, they will want to provide unusually high premium discounts
to encourage their current policyholders to adopt mitigation to reduce the losses from a
catastrophic disaster.  These imperfections on the demand and supply side imply that
building codes and enforcement mechanisms are a necessary ingredient for developing a
workable strategy for making mitigation an integral part of a disaster management
program.
The analyses in the paper were designed to show that there are benefits derived from the
adoption of cost-effective mitigation to many of the interested parties affected by natural
disasters.  Both property owners and insurers  will have their total discounted expected
losses reduced over the life of the property and  public sector agencies will have less need
to provide disaster assistance. Mitigation will also encourage reinsurers to reduce their
rates: encouraging policyholders to adopt RMMs provides an additional option for small
insurers to meet insolvency constraints and puts pressure on resinsurers not to charge too
high a premium.
Well-enforced building codes that incorporate cost-effective mitigation measures will
enable  the real estate community and developers to promote safer structures without
having to concern themselves with competitive pressures in their pricing decisions. There16
is an additional benefit of building codes in that it deals with misperceptions and
misinformation on the risk and  reduces the negative externalities to the large community
associated with the destruction or damage of buildings from a disaster.
Future Research Directions
Encouraging Adoption of Cost-Effective Mitigation Measures With respect
to future directions for research there is a need to specify the types of cost-effective
mitigation measures that could be applied to new and existing structures and how they can
be made part of a hazard management program. Only then can insurers, builders, and
financial institutions work together to incorporate these measures as part of building codes
and provide property owners with appropriate rewards for adopting them.
Consider the example in Section II  where the cost of  bracing a house is $1500 and the
annual expected reduction in damage is  $500.  If homeowners are reluctant to incur the
upfront cost of mitigation, then one way to make this measure financially attractive to the
property owner is for the bank to provide funds for mitigation through a home
improvement loan with a payback period  identical to the life of the mortgage. For
example, a 20 year loan  for  $1500 at an annual interest rate of  10  percent  would  result
in payments of  $145  per year. If the annual premium reduction from insurance reflected
the expected benefits of the mitigation measure (i.e. $500)  then the insured homeowner
will  have lower total payments by investing in mitigation than not undertaking the
measure.
To implement such a program, banks have to be convinced that they it is in their financial
interest to market home improvement loans for purposes of mitigation. They are much
more likely to do so if  insurers provide appropriate premium reductions to make such a
loan attractive to the mortgagee. For insurers to want to take this step, they will want to
have the freedom to charge insurance premiums which reflect the disaster risk rather than
being forced to offer coverage at subsidized rates. This may involve changes in the
insurance regulatory environment.
Micro-Model  Simulations  A broader strategy for undertaking research in this
area  would involve the analysis of the impact of disaster or accidents of different
magnitudes on different structures. In order to determine expected losses and  the
maximum probable losses arising from worst case scenarios, it may be necessary to
undertake long-term micro-model simulations. For example, one could examine the
impacts of earthquakes or hurricanes  of different magnitudes on the losses to a
community or region over a 10,000 year period. In the process one could determine
expected losses based on the probabilistic scenario of these disasters as well as the
maximum possible loss during this period based on a worst case scenario.17
By constructing large, medium and small representative insurers with specific balance
sheets, types of insurance portfolios, premium structures and a wide range of potential
financial instruments, one could examine the impact of different disasters on the insurer’s
profitability, solvency and performance through a simulation. Such an analysis may also
enable one to evaluate the performance of different mitigation measures and building
codes on certain structures in the community on both expected losses as well as worst
case scenarios.
 One could also consider the  impact that reinsurance will have on both the
insurer’s expected profits and  insolvency  with and without RMMs in place. An example
of  the application such an approach to a model city in California facing an earthquake risk
can be found in Kleindorfer and  Kunreuther (in press).
Turning to the new instruments from the capital market one could compare their relative
attractiveness to reinsurance for different types of insurers who have specific risks in
place. For example, the recent Act of God Bonds issued by USAA is similar in form to a
proportional reinsurance contract above a retention level. From USAA’s point of view it
may be priced more attractively than a comparable reinsurance contract.
3 One would
expect that the price of reinsurance will fall in the future given these and other financing
and hedging instruments against catastrophic risk unless there are certain features of
reinsurance that would prevent the price from declining, as discussed in Froot (1997).
Two very important outcomes would emerge from such simulations. First, it should be
possible to rank the importance of different financial instruments for different type firms.
For example, large firms may prefer Act of God bonds while smaller ones may want to
rely on excess loss reinsurance due to the high transaction costs associated with floating a
Act of Bond which requires a large enough amount to make it attractive to the insurer.
These simulation results could be compared with analytic studies of the  performance of
these instruments. If there are major differences it would be important to understand why
they exist.  Secondly, investors could determine whether the market price which emerged
from this simulation would be sufficiently attractive for them to provide investment capital
to support certain capital market instruments.
This  type of simulation modeling must rely on solid theoretical foundations in order to
delimit the boundaries of what is interesting and implementable in a market economy.
Such foundations will apply not only to the traditional issues of capital markets and the
insurance sector, but also to the decision processes of (re-)insurance companies, public
officials and property owners in determining levels of mitigation, insurance coverage and
other protective activities.  In the area of catastrophic risks, the interaction of these
decision processes, which are central to the outcome, seem to be considerably more
complicated than in other economic sectors, perhaps because of the uncertainty and
ambiguity of the causal mechanisms underlying natural hazards and their mitigation.
A  current research program jointly being undertaken by the Financial Institutions Center
and the Risk Management and Decision Processes Center at the Wharton School,
                                               
3 See Doherty (1997) for more details on these and other recent financial instruments18
University of Pennsylvania  is addressing all the above issues.  In the context of this
Conference  on Financial Risk Management for Natural Catastrophes we are particularly
interested in understanding the impact of different institutional arrangements in other
countries on the role that insurance coupled with  mitigation and other policy tools can
play in reducing losses from future natural disasters.19
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TABLE 1
MAXIMUM WILLINGNESS TO PAY (WTP)
FOR MITIGATION









5 $2,085 $ 1,793
10 $ 3,380 $2,513
20 $4,682 $2,91723
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF MAX WILLINGNESS TO PAY (WTP)
% Individuals in Each Category
       Price Not Given Price Given=$1,500
5 Years 10 Years 5 Years 10 Years
$0-$500 5% 5% 7% 4%
$501-$1,000 7% 7% 16% 16%
$1,001-$1,500 45% 17% 43% 44%
$1,501-$2,000 31% 36% 16% 19%
$2,001-$2,500 5% 14% 3% 0%
$2,501-$3,000 5% 14% 3% 0%
$3,000 up 2% 7% 12% 17%
no of subjects =42 No of subjects =4224
TABLE 3
IMPLIED DISCOUNT RATES FOR MAX WILLINGNESS TO PAY (WTP)
       Price Not Given Price Given=$1,500
Discount Rate % Individuals Discount Rate % Individuals
0-10% 6% 0-10% 8%
10-20% 8% 10-20% 6%
20-50% 0% 20-50% 0%
50-60% 4% 50-60% 6%
60-70% 14% 60-70% 14%
70-80% 20% 70-80% 22%
80-90% 14% 80-90% 14%
90-100% 0% 90-100% 0%
infinite*
(No change in WTP)
34% infinite*
(No change in WTP)
30%
no of subjects = 42
* 17%: no change in probability of
purchase
   17%: increase in probability of
purchase
no of subjects = 42
* 15%: no change in probability of
purchase
  15%: increase in probability of
purchase25
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS FOLLOWING DIFFERENT DECISION RULES  IN
MAKING DECISIONS REGARDING ADOPTION OF PROTECTIVE
INVESTMENTS CONSISTENT
Reasonable Discounting




















SOURCE:  Kunreuther, Onculer, and Slovic  (1997)26
TABLE  5
  PROBABILITIES OF  DAMAGE AND RESPECTIVE LOSSES FOR INSURERS









0 1 $               0 $               0
1 1/20 $    250,000 $    200,000
2 1/40 $    500,000 $    400,000
3 1/80 $    750,000 $    600,000
4 1/100 $ 1,000,000 $    800,000
5 1/125 $ 1,250,000 $ 1,000,000
6 1/150 $ 1,500,000 $ 1,200,000
7 1/180 $ 1,750,000 $ 1,400,000
8 1/200 $ 2,000,000 $ 1,600,00027
APPENDIX  1
MODELING THE DEMAND FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIVITIES
BY PROPERTY OWNERS
Discounted utility theory has been the dominant approach for modeling decisions to invest
in protective measures when future outcomes are known with certainty. The basic concept
is that people act as though they utilize an exponential  discount function for evaluating a
sequence of deterministic outcomes in each period t [x(t)] over a time horizon of T
periods. An individual wants to allocate resources so as to maximize:
￿ ￿ d
t
t x u t )] ( [ ) ( (1)
where u[x(t)] is  a concave ratio utility function and d is the discount factor for one period
with  0 < d < 1. If individuals utilize a discount rate of r then the DU model implies that
d(t) = [1/(1+r)]
t.
For investments in protective measures where outcomes are specified by a probability
distribution, individuals must decide whether to expend money today to reduce the
consequences over a T period horizon where there is a probability pi of outcome  xi(t),
i=1...n occurring in any period t ˛T.  If the individual’s objective is to maximize
discounted expected utility (DEU) where DEU is defined as:
1











t x u p t
(2)
Consider a protective measure that costs Z dollars which yields a disutility to the
individual of  u(-Z).  If one invests in this RMM, there is a probability p
*
i £ pi of a loss
xi(t) in any period t, so that the expected benefits of investing in  this protective measure
over the time horizon T is  given by the discounted expected utility, [u(BT)], where:
)] ( [ ) ( ) ( ] [ t x u p p t B u i
t i
i i T ￿ - ￿ d =￿￿
* (3)
A person who maximizes DEU will invest in the RMM whenever  u(BT)+ u(-Z) > 0.28
APPENDIX  2
MODELING INSURERS BEHAVIOR WITH RESPECT TO MITIGATION
Consider the following scenario as it relates to insurers decision processes with respect to
the premiums they are willing to charge for mitigation:
NOTATION
p = annual probability of  a loss  for a single house   (e.g.  p = 1/100)
L” = Loss without mitigation   (e.g. L”=$250,000)
L’ = Loss with mitigation     (e.g. L’= $200,000)
E(L”)  =  p L”  =Expected Annual Loss without  Mitigation  (e.g. $2500)
E(L’)  =  p L’ =  Expected Annual Loss with  Mitigation   (e.g.  $2000)
P”= E(L”) = actuarially fair  premium without Mitigation
P’= E(L’) = actuarially fair  premium without Mitigation
M = Minimum premium reduction from P’ for homeowner to adopt mitigation
ASSUMPTIONS
The insurer provides coverage for a single type structure  (e.g. concrete block house)
in an earthquake prone area.
The insurer  has  written  N earthquake policies on the single type structure. It may have
other insurance policies in force but the concern here is only  on its earthquake business.
The insurer  has calculated the probability that  n  or more homes will be damaged by a
severe quake (i.e. there is not a perfect correlation between losses) and has estimated the
resulting losses with and without mitigation in place.  Table  5   presents these data for an
illustrative example.29
LARGE AND SMALL INSURER  PREMIUM SETTING PROCESS
LARGE INSURERS  (NO INSOLVENCY CONSTRAINT)
The large insurer has N earthquake policies and must decide what  premium (PL) it will
charge. Let SL  = the  large insurer’s surplus to pay claims which consists of its initial
surplus  (AL) plus the premiums from its N policies (NPL)  It has determined the
probability  pi  that it will have i losses  from an earthquake.  The  size of each loss  L will
be L” if the property owner doesn’t mitigate or L’  if he does.
The large insurer’s objective is to choose a premium PL £ P” so as to
Max [AL + NPL -  ￿pi  i  L ]         (1)
subject to  the following insolvency constraint
                  8
Probability ￿ [AL+N(PL ) - i L] £ q*       (2)
                            i=1
where q* =  maximum probability of insolvency
In the example given in the paper, large insurers are assumed to have SL = $1.2 million   so
that the insolvency constraint given by (2) will be met when mitigation is not in place and
a premium PL = P” is charged. As seen from Table 5, (2) will also be satisfied if  mitigation
is adopted by property owners and PL = P’.
Hence the large insurer will set a premium which maximizes   (1) but is interested in
reducing the premium if it will both encourage the property to mitigate their home and
increase the insurer’s expected profit. The insurer  knows that the range of  premium
reductions that satisfies both conditions is between M and P”-P’. Note that  M is the
minimum premium reduction from P” that will lead the property owner to adopt
mitigation. If  M >P”-P’ then mitigation will not be encouraged because the insurer will be
forced to provide a reduction in premium that will cause them to experience an expected
loss on their earthquake business.
If  M < P”-P’,  in a perfectly competitive market the insurer will charge   P=P’   to
encourage mitigation.  If the insurer has some monopoly power it will reduce premiums by
less than P”-P’.
 Example:   If   M= $3  P”=25 and and P’ = $20 then the insurer will charge a premium
somewhere between $20 and $22.30
SMALL INSURER  (INSOLVENCY CONSTRAINT IS EXCEEDED WITHOUT MITIGATION)
The small insurer has N earthquake policies and must decide what  premium (PS) it will
charge. Let SS  = the  small insurer’s surplus to pay claims which consists of its initial
surplus  (AS) plus the premiums from its N policies (NPS).  It has a probability  pi  that it
will have i losses (L)  from an earthquake.  The  size of each loss L will be L” if the
property owner doesn’t mitigate or L’  if he does.
The large insurer’s objective is to choose a premium PL £ P” so as to
Max [AS + NPS -  ￿pi  i  L ]         (3)
subject to  the following insolvency constraint
                  8
Probability ￿ [AS+N(PS ) - i L] £ q*    (4)
                            i=1
where q* =  maximum probability of insolvency
Small insurers are assumed not to have sufficient surplus  (SS) when mitigation is not in
place  so that the insolvency constraint given by (4)  for L=L” will not be met. In the
example in the paper  SS = $700,000  consisting  of  AS  = $450,000   and actuarial
premiums for 100 policies  100 (P”) = $250,000.  The small insurer can either purchase
reinsurance and/or encourage mitigation through premium reduction to meet (4). We will
briefly examine each of these decisions based on the illustrative example in the paper using
the data from Table 5.
Purchasing  Reinsurance
Suppose that a reinsurer is willing to provide coverage of  $250,000 to protect the insurer
against losses exceeding  $500,000 (i.e. $250,000 in excess of $500,000). The reinsurer
will suffer a loss of  $250,000 in excess of $500,000 if there 3 or more losses . This
probability  is given by  1/80 so that the actuarially fair premium is  R =1/80($250,000)
=$3,300.
 For the example  above  we can determine the maximum reinsurance premium (Rmax) the
insurer would pay for this excess coverage to satisfy (4).  Specifically with $250
(thousand) in excess of $500 (thousand) reinsurance,  (4)  becomes:
          2                                                                                                               8
Prob{ ￿[$700 -Rmax - i L”]+[$700-Rmax -750 +250]+￿ [$700 -Rmax - i L”+250]}£ .01  (5)
        i=1                      i=4
where the figures are in  thousands of dollars.31
Rmax is determined by finding the value where the surplus of the insurer is zero when there
are 3 losses. To see this, note from Table 5 that the insurer’s surplus will be greater than
zero if it suffers 0, 1 or 2 losses and that the probability of suffering four or more losses is
less than .01. Hence if  q*=.01, the value of Rmax is determined by solving:
                                $700-Rmax -750 +250=0.  (6)
imply that  Rmax = $200. This means that, in theory, the insurer is willing to pay  as much
as $200,000 for reinsurance. The actual reinsurance premium for this example will be
somewhere between  $3,333 and this upper limit.
Encouraging Mitigation Through Premium Reductions
As an alternative to reinsurance the small insurer may actually be willing to set a premium
PS   which is below the actuarially fair rate to encourage its current policyholders to adopt
mitigation and meet the insolvency constraint given by (4). In other words it will be willing
to charge a premium PS  so that individual losses will be L’. Note that we are assuming
that the insurer must continue to provide earthquake coverage to its existing
policyholders. Otherwise, it would have an incentive to cancel some policies to satisfy (4).
From Table 5  one sees that if  q*= 1/100  then the insurer needs to set premiums so it has
sufficient surplus to cover  3 losses. With mitigation its claims are reduced from $750,000
to $600,000 when 3 structures are damaged. Hence to determine PS which satisfies (4)
one computes
$450,000 -100 PS  - $600,000 = 0     (6)
This means  that  PS  = $1,500,  a premium below the actuarially fair value of P’=$2,000.
Thus the small insurer  loses money on its earthquake business to encourage mitigation
and satisfy its insolvency constraint.